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Abstract
In this paper author presents Hannah Arendt’s warning that totalitarian solutions may 
outlive totalitarian regimes and Georgio Agamben’s thesis that Auschwitz and Omarska 
are essentially the same. If they were right, as Kurelić tries to show, the reincarnations of 
totalitarian spirit are the exact opposite of what the European Union was designed to be. 
The prevention of the WW II type horrors on the continent was one of the self-understood 
foundations of the entire project. We now know that, as far as preventing wars in Europe 
goes, the project is seriously flawed. In that respect the European failure should serve as a 
troubling example for those who think about global prevention of anti-human behavior. 
Kurelić argues that evil is the unintended telos of the camp, and that Arendt’s theory of 
totalitarianism still explains more that Agamben’s predatory biopolitics.
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At the end of her famous book The Origins of Totalitarianism Hannah Arendt warned 
that totalitarian solutions might survive the fall of totalitarian regimes. Giorgio Agamben 
lives and writes in the world in which Arendt’s prophecy has come true. In this paper I 
will compare Arendt’s and Agamben’s attempts to understand concentration and 
extermination camps, and especially their importance for the way in which modern liberal 
democracies function nowadays. For Arendt the camp was an appearance of radical evil 
which revealed the essence of totalitarianism. It was the most important institution of 
totalitarian regimes. Nazism and Stalinism share the ability to exterminate millions of 
innocent human beings for no utilitarian reason. What they share is not a set of 
institutions or the mode of production but the camp, the place in which humanity itself is 
put into question, the place in which a new form of evil comes into existence. With the 
collapse of totalitarian regimes and the closure of camps we got rid of radical evil, but not 
of totalitarian solutions which can bring it back.
Giorgio Agamben tells a different story. In his narrative Arendt’s theory plays a big role 
but his question is focused on the world in which we live. His question is not just how 
Auschwitz was possible, but how Omarska and Rwanda were possible in a post-
totalitarian world. For Arendt, the appearance of a totalitarian regime capable of opening 
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Auschwitz was the result of the collapse of European civilization which happened during 
the World War I and the Big Crisis. For Agamben, Auschwitz is the most radical 
materialization of the deadly potential of European states hidden in the transformation of 
politics into biopolitics. 
This paper consists of four segments. In the first one I will briefly present Heidegger’s 
understanding of technology. The reason for starting a paper on the camps with 
Heidegger’s essay on technology is simple. I would like to show that both Arendt and 
Agamben struggle with the telos of the camp when they try to explain what actually 
happened in Auschwitz. Arendt holds that the ultimate telos of the camps is the 
destruction of humanity, while Agemben thinks that the telos of the camps is the 
production of living corpses, the Muslims, Muselmänner. 
In the second segment I present Agamben’s understanding of politics focused on th 
state of exception. Agamben argues that the camp is not a thing of the past but a ‘hidden 
paradigm’ of the political space in which we live. This means that contemporary liberal 
democracies, which present themselves as the most desirable form of government for all 
peoples and cultures on earth, are tainted by totalitarian solutions themselves.
The third segment discusses the similarities and differences in Arendt’s and Agamben’s 
understandings of the extermination of the Jews, while in the final segment  the focus is 
on Agamben’s idea that Omarska and Auschwitz are essentially the same. I will argue that 
an arendtean understanding of Omarska would be that it is a reappearance of radical evil 
and that the radical evil story paradoxically explains more than biopolitics. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss Agamben’s provocative claim that the post-Cold-
war New World order may become the worst tyranny ever created. I will do that by 
comparing his solutions to Arendt’s ideas. She would not disagree, but her explanations of 
the causes and potential remedies would significantly differ. We do not live in a post-
genocidal world order but in one in which the most atrocious genocidal crimes against 
humanity are in-calculated, televised and sometimes even partially prosecuted.
I.
In Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben points out that the extermination of Jews was 
described by Martin Heidegger as the “fabrication of corpses”. Arendt also mentions the 
“fabrication of corpses” in her interview with Gunter Gaus in 1964. Extermination camps 
are often described as ‘death factories’ as if there was something technological in the 
fabrication of corpses. For this reason I start the paper with a brief presentation of 
Heidegger’s essay The Question Concerning Technology. The other reason is the fact that 
both Agamben and Arendt, were strongly influenced by his philosophy in general. 
The Question Concerning Technology wants to answer what technology is. Technology 
is usually understood as a means to an end, as something instrumental. “Wherever ends 
are pursued and means are employed, wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns 
causality.”1 To ask about technology we must ask about causality, so the four causes are a 
logical beginning of thinking on causality. Heidegger’s example is a silver chalice. The 
first cause is the causa materialis, the material in which the chalice is made. The second 
1  Martin Heidegger: The Question Concerning Technology, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1977, p. 6. 
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one is the causa formalis, the shape into which the material enters. The third is the causa 
finalis, the end, the religious rite in which it fulfils its purpose and the forth cause is the 
causa efficins, the silversmith. Heidegger believes that in our time the causa efficiens 
dominates. Cause is understood as something which brings something about, obtains 
effects and sets the standard for all causality. In Greek thought the concept of causality 
was understood in a completely different way, points out Heidegger, for them it had 
nothing to do with bringing about or effecting. “What we call cause (Ursache) and the 
Romans call causa is called aition by the Greeks, that to which something is indebted… 
The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for 
something else.”2 The silversmith would not be understood as the causa efficines by 
Aristotle. Heidegger explains: “The silversmith considers carefully and gathers together 
the three aforementioned ways of being responsible and indebted. To consider carefully is 
in Greek legein, logos. Legein is rooted in apophainesthai, to bring forward into 
appearance.”3 The essence of causality unites them from the beginning, and Heidegger 
calls it “occasioning”. “But in what, then, does the playing in unison of the four ways of 
occasioning play? They let what is not yet present arrive into presencing. Accordingly, 
they are unifiedly ruled over by a bringing that brings what presence into appearance… It 
is of utmost importance that we think bringing forth in its full scope and at the same time 
in the sense in which the Greeks thought it. Not only handcraft manufacture, not only 
artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing- forth, 
poiesis. Physis also, the arising of something from itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. 
Physis is indeed poiesis in the highest sense.”4 Techne belongs to poiesis, and it is not only 
the name for the different skills of craftsmen, but a mode of revealing (aletheuin). 
Heidegger wants to show that techne should be understood as revealing rather than as 
manufacturing because it like nature brings-forth. Techne as a mode of revealing is, 
strictly speaking, not instrumental. For Heidegger, modern technology is also a mode of 
revealing but not in the sense of poiesis. He explains: “The revealing that rules in modern 
technology is a challenging (Herausfordern), which puts to nature the unreasonable 
demand that it supplies energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”5 This is 
essentially new. The old windmill depends entirely on the wind’s blowing, it does not 
“unlock energy” from the air in order to store it. Unlocking and storing are ways of 
revealing. “We now name that challenging claim which gathers man thither to order the 
self-revealing as standing-reserve: ‘Ge-stell’ (Enframing).”6 Ge-stell is the essence of 
modern technology. Man participates in the ‘activity’ of revealing, man is asked to reveal 
the real as standing reserve. Human activity turns nature into potential energy. A river is 
potential electricity and so are the atoms. There is nothing subjective in modern 
technology and therefore nothing instrumental. In Heidegger’s philosophy Ge-stell is the 
ontological situation of modern man; it is therefore given and not changeable by human 
action. 
2  Ibid., p. 7. 
3  Ibid., p. 8. 
4  Ibid., p.10. 
5  Ibid., p. 14. 
6  Ibid., p. 19. 
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I will return to Heidegger’s ontological understanding of technology in the third 
segment, especially in relation to the causa finalis , the end, the telos of the camp, but 
first I would like to present Agamben’s original theory in which the camp is “the hidden 
matrix and nomos of the political place in which we are still living.”7
II.
Agamben’s book Means Without End is the best collection of provocative ideas later 
developed in the Homo Sacer trilogy (Homo Sacer, State of Exception, Remnants of  
Auschwitz,). The essays published in Means… were written between 1990 and 1995 in the 
post- Berlin-wall Europe in which short-lived optimism faced the reality of a war on the 
continent. Agamben does not celebrate the alleged historical triumph of liberal democracy 
because everywhere he looks he sees corrupted European states which lost their 
legitimacy; his native Italy being the best example. Agamben says: “I believe that one of 
the few things that can be declared with certainty is that… all the peoples of Europe… 
have gone bankrupt. We live after the failure of peoples.”8 The same can be said for the 
western nation states. “The homes – the “fatherlands” – that these states endeavored to 
build revealed themselves in the end to be only lethal traps for the very “peoples” that 
were supposed to inhabit them.”9 The post-Cold-war Europe realized that the East and 
the West are barely distinguishable. The East adopted capitalist consumerism and got rid 
of the Leninist party, while the West renounced the balance of power and real freedom of 
thought in the name of totalitarian “electoral machine of majority vote” and “media 
control over public opinion.”10 Agamben finds the type of political order which was on the 
horizon after 1989 unacceptable. The contact of the corrupt West and the defeated East is 
not likely to produce a functioning global democracy but a supranational police state. 
Agamben started working on a book designed to criticize the new planetary order, but 
ended up with more.
Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life is a book that tries to rethink the 
European political tradition by using a set of concepts never before used in Agamben’s 
way. He writes about the refugee, the state of exception and the concentration camp to 
show how the differences between the public and the private, the law and the power, the 
human being and the citizen and even between the judiciary and the executive are all put 
in question in the state in which we live. Traditional understanding of politics cannot 
recognize the fundamental problem of our civilization, the biopolitical attempt to  
manage the survival of humanity. Agamben’s thesis is that we live in a world which does 
not recognize that even the so-called liberal democracies function in a way close to 
totalitarianism, that the state of exception has become a rule in them, and that the camp 
is not an institution belonging exclusively to defeated totalitarian regimes but the “matrix 
of political space” in which we live. He tries to explain this thesis in a number of ways; 
however, in the context of this paper the most important is his attempt to reinterpret the 
7  Giorgio Agamben: Homo Sacer, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998, p. 166. 
8  Giorgio Agamben: Means Without End, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000, p. 142  
9  Ibid. ,p. 140. 
10  Ibid., p. 81. 
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concept of sovereignty, and to make a creative fusion of Arendt’s research on 
totalitarianism and Foucault’s biopolitics. 
Agamben’s understanding of sovereignty is strongly influenced by Schmitt’s ideas 
presented in Political Theology. For Carl Schmitt the sovereign is the one who decides on 
the state of exception. The sovereign is the person who can suspend the laws of the state 
in order to protect the political order. In Schmitt’s theory this is important because it 
shows that the regulated system of laws cannot survive without the introduction and 
intervention of genuine political power. The sovereign who declares the state of exception 
stands outside the judicial order and tries to save the order by temporarily suspending it. 
Agamben goes one step further and argues that the state of exception, which is for 
Schmitt still something exceptional, usually declared in the times of war, in modernity 
becomes a rule. In his opinion our understanding of sovereignty derived from the idea of 
a social contract in which the sovereign is the people who create the state, misses the 
predatory character of the state in which we live. Hobbes’ sovereign, Leviathan is 
designed to escape the state of nature. The state of nature is the state of potential war and 
therefore the state of exception. In Agamben’s interpretation Hobbes’ sovereign stays 
outside the juridical order in order to protect it, so, to avoid the state of war Hobbes 
introduces a permanent state of exception within the state. Consequently, the state is not 
something that is simply created in opposition to the state of nature; rather, it is a form of 
sovereignty which contains nature in itself as the state of exception. To protect the state 
from falling back into the state of war, the sovereign can ignore the laws of the state. The 
true meaning and the true danger of this kind of a sovereign power becomes obvious 
when one unveils the original contact between the sovereign power and bare life. This is 
why Foucault’s biopolitics plays one of the key roles in Agamben’s argument. 
In The History of Sexuality Foucault wrote that modern man was “an animal whose 
politics calls his existence as living being into question”. Foucault holds that the modern 
era introduces biopolitics as a way of control of bodies and bodily functions of citizens. 
Agamben explains: “According to Foucault, a society’s “threshold of biological modernity” 
is situated at the point at which the species and the individual as a simple living body 
become what is at stake in a society’s political strategies… In particular, the development 
and triumph of capitalism would not have been possible, from this perspective, without 
the disciplinary control achieved by the new bio-power, which, through a series of 
appropriate technologies, so to speak created “docile bodies” that it needed.”11 Agamben 
insists on the Greek distinction between zoe and bios, in which zoe means the simple fact 
of being alive, while bios is a way of life as in bios politicos. So, biopolitics introduced by 
Foucault actually shows that the modern mechanisms of the state and society focus on 
zoe, on the naked existence of human body. According to Foucault, the original 
sovereignty had the formula ‘to make die and to let live’. Once the sovereign was the one 
who had a power to legitimately kill a person, after the introduction of biopolitics the 
formula changed into ‘to make live and to let die’. As it is, Foucault’s concept does not 
show the predatory character of modern sovereignty and certainly does not explain how 
the camp became the hidden nomos of our political world. The argument is completed 
with the reinterpretation of Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism.
11  Giorgio Agamben: Homo Sacer, ibid., p. 3. 
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Agamben tries to make a creative fusion of Foucault’s criticism of biopolitics and 
Arendt’s criticism of totalitarianism and argues that concentration camps are the ultimate 
playground of biopolitics. Arendt is important for Agamben for a number of reasons, but 
two are fundamental. With her help he wants to explain the collapse of European political 
order, and the birth of camps as a result of that collapse. However, unlike Arendt, he 
wants to show that both phenomena are biopolitical. This is how the two key concepts of 
Agamben’s theory come into play – the refugee and the camp. Both concepts play the 
central role in the famous ninth chapter of The Origins…’The Decline of the Nation-State 
and the End of the Rights of Man’. A refugee is a person who, after being forced to leave 
one nation-state, tries to find refuge in another. The problem is that a human being who 
allegedly has human rights as a human being finds out that human rights are protected 
only within nation-states, so, to be thrown out of the state means to be thrown out of 
humanity altogether. Refugees lose ‘the right to have rights’, they lose a community in 
which they can be political. A camp is a place for the unwanted. This became dramatically 
obvious for thousands of Europeans after the World War I, and for the Jews before and 
during the World War II. The post-WWI situation shows how nation-states in decline, the 
states based on the trinity of state-nation-territory, do not have a solution for the stateless 
people. Arendt points out that the internment camp became a standard solution for the 
problem of displaced persons prior to the WWII. 
Agamben agrees. He wants to show that the internment camp represents a place in 
which human life is reduced to bare life. This is something that never occurred to either 
Arendt of Foucault. This is how Homo Sacer became the key figure of the book. As the 
title suggests, homo sacer is the character in which the sovereign power and bare life 
meet.
Homo sacer is a figure from the Roman criminal law, a guilty person who is put in a 
unique situation; he cannot be sacrificed, but if someone kills him, this will not be seen as 
homicide. Homo sacer is alive but can be killed without any legal consequences by anyone 
at any time. He is alive but as good as dead, he is doomed to death, a living corpse. 
Homos sacer is a living representation of bare life. The sovereign is the one who decides 
when a man becomes a homo sacer. 
Now all elements for Agamben’s story are in place. He is saying that we live in a world 
in which the original understanding of sovereignty ‘to make die and to let live’ has 
returned via modern biopolitics. This time the sovereign is not a king or a despot but the 
contemporary state. The damage was done in a few key moments of European history. In 
the 17th century biopolitics was introduced with the care for the life and health of the 
subjects and combined with the science of police. It became essential for the functioning 
of the modern state which is the nation state. The continental nation state system 
collapsed during and after the WWI and this triggered a new phase in the relationship 
between the sovereign state and biopolitics. After the WWI the state of exception became 
the rule and the camp was added to the original trinity (state-nation-territory) of the 
nation state. The camp takes care of the stateless and unwanted, whether they come from 
the outside, like refugees, or from the inside, like the Gypsies and the Jews.
The most provocative aspect of Agamben’s theory is his idea that biopolitics secures the 
continuity between democratic and totalitarian states. The very fact that the state was 
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biopolitical before the WWI makes it potentially totalitarian, and deadly. The step from 
the standard ‘make live and let die’ biopolitics’ to the Nazi thanatopolitics of the 
concentration camp was made when the state got involved in euthanasia. The decline of 
the nation state turned into a lasting crisis, the state of exception became the rule, and the 
state decided to assume care for the nation’s biological life. The state tries to cure the 
“biopolitical fractures” of the people, the cracks within a nation derived from ethnic, racial 
or class differences. Biopolitics has to produce a single unified people. When that 
happened a lonely figure of homo sacer, a person who cannot be sacrificed but can be 
killed by anyone, became identical with a citizen of the state. In the beginning only the 
refugee in the camp was reduced to bare life, but eventually all citizens were at mercy of 
their own state. Agamben explains: 
“Modern totalitarianism can be defined as the establishment, by means of the state of 
exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of 
political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot 
be integrated into the political system. Since then, the voluntary creation of a 
permanent state of emergency (though perhaps not declared in the technical sense) 
has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called 
democratic ones.12
In Agamben’s opinion all camps have something fundamental in common. Dachau, the 
internment camp, Auschwitz and the refugee camp are all created in a legal lacuna 
outside juridical order, which is (the lacuna) at the same time included in the system of 
the state power. It is a place in which pure political power can act unbothered by law. 
Seen from this perspective, the football stadium in Bari, in which Albanian illegal 
immigrants were held, Guantanamo and Auschwitz are essentially the same. They are all 
places in which detainees are completely unprotected and reduced to bare life. Agamben 
writes: 
“Not only do the Taliban captured in Afghanistan not enjoy the status of POWs as 
defined by the Geneva Convention, they do not even have the status of persons 
charged with a crime according to American laws. Neither prisoners nor persons 
accused, but simply “detainees”, they are the object of a pure de facto rule, of a 
detention that is indefinite not only in temporal sense but in its very nature as well, 
since it is entirely removed from the law and juridical oversight. The only thing to 
which it could possibly be compared is the legal situation of the Jews in the Nazi 
Lager, who, along with their citizenship, had lost every legal identity, but at least 
retained their identity as Jews.”13 
The biopolitical essence of the state of exception in which the sovereign power meets bare 
life is not only something that is shared between dramatically different places like Bari 
and Dachau, it is also something shared between dramatically different regimes like the 
12  Giorgio Agamben: State of Exception, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005, p. 2. 
13  Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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Nazi Germany and the modern democratic state. This essence is the “hidden paradigm” of 
the world in which we live. 
This completes wicked philosophical sarcasm. While the West talks about human 
rights, the sacredness of life and the rule of law it puts refugees and enemies in a place 
which is, formally speaking, indistinguishable from Dachau. In which they are as good as 
dead, and in which their lives are as sacred as homo sacer.
It is very likely that both Agamben’s favorites, Arendt and Foucault would disagree with 
his argument. In the following segment I will try to show a few key differences between 
Arendt’s and Agamben’s understanding of the camp. 
III.
In her reply to Eric Voegelin’s review of The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt explains 
why the title of the book should be changed into ‘The Elements of Totalitarianism’. Arendt 
realizes that the origins could be mixed up with the causes and this is not what her book is 
about. In her words, the book gives a historical account of “the elements which 
crystallized into totalitarianism”. When Arendt started writing her book, it was not about 
totalitarianism but about the appearance of radical evil in Auschwitz. She tried to 
comprehend something beyond comprehension, and realized that the horrors of Nazism 
are the outcome of total bankruptcy of the European civilization. The structure of the 
book: Antisemitism, Imperialism, Totalitarianism unveils that the inability of bourgeois 
politics to solve economic problems caused by imperialism created the space in which 
elements like antisemitism, the appearance of the masses and the mob, eugenics, racism, 
pan-movements and conspiracy theories crystallized into totalitarianism. Nazism offered 
radical solutions for the problems created before its appearance. The only way in which 
Stalinism can be brought into this story is by comparing Auschwitz and Gulag, and this is 
how the camp became the central institution of totalitarianism. Russia was obviously not 
a part of European history responsible for the birth of Nazism, but the non-utilitarian way 
in which human beings were killed during Stalin’s rule and the extermination of the Jews 
are essentially the same. The non-utilitarian aspect of those crimes, the destruction of 
innocent life for no rational reason, is what makes them radical. 
Agamben does not use the concept of totalitarianism very often and there is a good 
reason for this. For him the camp is not something that the Bolsheviks and the Nazis have 
in common, but something that liberal democracies and totalitarian regimes have in 
common. So, the camp is not the differentia specifica of totalitarian regimes but the 
shared hidden nomos of modernity. Obviously there is a fundamental difference in his 
and Arendt’s understanding of the camp. When Arendt formulated her theory of 
totalitarianism she argued that the link of the two quite different regimes is their 
previously unseen ability to unleash the radical evil. This kind of evil is present on earth 
only in extermination camps and in Gulag. For Arendt Dachau is not a totalitarian type of 
concentration camp because the violence exercised there is utilitarian. Totalitarian terror 
starts in Germany after 1938 and in Soviet Union after 1930. In Arendt’s theory Lenin’s 
regime was not totalitarian.
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Agamben’s understanding of the camp is dramatically different because for him it is a 
space in which pure power meets bare life, so there is no difference between Dachau and 
Auschwitz, both places being the examples of the state of exception which became the 
rule. This means that the totalitarian camp is for Arendt something essentially new, while 
for Agamben the difference between Dachau and Auschwitz is not essential, but gradual. 
He, of course, goes much further and actually says that in essence all camps are the same 
because they are all biopolitical states of exception. Only in that sense can the camp be the 
hidden matrix of the political space in which we live. 
This raises a fundamental question of the telos of the camp. What is the telos of 
Auschwitz for Arendt and Agamben? 
Now it is time to return to Heidegger’s essay on technology. What would be the causa 
finalis of an extermination camp? The expected answer would be extermination but 
neither Arendt nor Agamben give this answer. The camp is for them an experiment. 
Arendt writes: “The camps are meant not only to exterminate people and degrade human 
beings, but also serve as the ghastly experiment of eliminating, under scientifically 
controlled conditions, spontaneity itself as an expression of human behavior and of 
transforming the human personality into a mere thing, into something that even animals 
are not; for Pavlov’s dog, which, as we know, was trained to eat not when it was hungry 
but when a bell ring, was a perverted animal.”14 
The camps are the experimental ground for the realization of totalitarian ideologies, the 
ideologies which believe that anything is possible. 
“The concentration camps are the laboratories where changes in human nature are 
tested, and their shamefulness therefore is not just the business of their inmates and 
those who run them according to strict “scientific” standards; it is the concern of all 
men. Suffering, of which there has been always too much on earth, is not the issue, 
nor is the number of victims. Human nature as such is at stake, and even though it 
seems that these experiments succeed not in changing man but only in destroying 
him, by creating a society in which the nihilistic banality of homo homini lupus is 
constantly realized, one should bear in mind the necessary limitations to an 
experiment which requires global control in order to show conclusive results.”15 
This simply means that the real telos of the camp goes beyond extermination. It is actually 
the redefinition of human nature through the destruction of freedom, nativity and above 
all spontaneity. 
Agamben carefully read these sentences and recognized the biopolitical character of the 
experiment. His theory is in a way a biopolitical reconstruction of the origins of 
Auschwitz. And this is precisely why the Muslim, Muselmann is the central character of 
his book Remnants of Auschwitz. The Muslims were inmates of the camp who were 
reduced to bare life, the living dead, persons who lost all will and all consciousness. The 
Muslim is a stage of existence between an inmate and death. Agamben argues that the 
Muslim reveals the biopolitical essence of the camp. In his opinion the camp is the most 
14  Hannah Arendt: The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace & Company, New York, 1979, p. 438. 
15  Ibid. ,pp. 458-459. 
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absolute biopolitical space ever. If the camp is a laboratory for creating sub-humans, an 
experiment in destruction of spontaneity, then the Muslim is a biopolitical result, and a 
biopolitical proof of Arendt’s thesis. However, there is a significant difference. The 
experiment is radically evil because like an abyss it sucks everyone in. It is not a utilitarian 
search for the humanity without spontaneity but a space in which the idea that everything 
is possible makes the end of humanity possible. The Bolsheviks did not make the Muslims 
but the evil unleashed by them was just as radical. The radical evil makes Auschwitz and 
Gulag the same and Auschwitz and Dachau different. To use Agamben’s vocabulary, there 
was no biopolitical fracture to heal in purges in which members of the same party, i.e. the 
same People are eliminated for no rational reason. This is, of course, one of the reasons 
why Agamben stays away from Arendt’s original concept of totalitarianism. Auschwitz is a 
part of the story of the West. Agamben writes: 
”Biopolitical caesuras are essentially mobile, and in each case they isolate a further 
zone in the biological continuum, a zone which corresponds to a space of increasing 
Entwurdigung and degradation. Thus the non-Aryan passes into the Jew, the Jew 
into the deportee, the deportee into prisoner (Hafling), until biopolitical caesuras 
reach their final limit in the camp. This limit is the Muselmann. At the point in which 
Hafling becomes a Muselmann, the biopolitics of racism so to speak transcends race, 
penetrating into a threshold in which it is no longer possible to establish caesuras… It 
is then possible to understand the decisive function of the camps in the system of 
Nazi biopolitics. They are not merely the place of death and extermination; they are 
also, and above all, the site of the production of the Muselmann, the final biopolitical 
substance to be isolated in the biological continuum,”16
In this sense death becomes an epiphenomenon. The Muslim is the telos of the Nazi 
camp. The Nazis reduced the Jews to bare life and this reduction of a human being to a 
sub-human is biopower’s supreme result and a hidden ambition. 
Agamben’s attempt to biopolitically interpret Arendt’s understanding of the camp as an 
experiment in destruction of humanity shows that the fundamental problem of this idea 
which they share is its telos. Why would the camp be the space in which humanity itself is 
attacked consciously?17 The destruction of humanity is what actually happens after 1938 
in Germany and after 1930 in Soviet Union, not something that was planed from the 
beginning. The humanity was not destroyed on purpose but the camps realize a phantom 
world in which the essence of human beings, as understood by Arendt, is destroyed. If she 
wants to keep the concept of totalitarianism, and the camp as a link between the two 
different regimes, she has to give up the camp as an experiment. Agamben does not have 
16  Giorgio Agamben: Remnants of Auschwitz, Zone Books, New York, 2002, pp. 84-85. 
17  Arendt was struggling with this question? In ‘The Image of Hell’ (1946) she writes: “Once inside the death 
factories, everything became an accident completely beyond control of those who did the suffering and those 
who inflicted it. And in more than one case those who inflicted the suffering one day became the sufferers the 
next.” (Hannah Arendt: Essays in Understanding, (ed. Jerome Kohn) Harcourt Brace & Company, New York, 
1994, p. 198-199.) This certainly does not sound like an experiment. In The Origins … she says: “To be sure, 
totalitarian dictators do not consciously embark upon the road to insanity. The point is rather that our 
bewilderment about the anti-utilitarian character of the totalitarian state structure springs from the mistaken 
notion that we are dealing with a normal state after all.” (op. cit., p. 411)
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this problem. It looks as if in Arendt’s argument the telos of the camp was the destruction 
of humanity but she knows that it was not understood in that way by the Nazis, and 
certainly not by the Bolsheviks. Arendt unconsciously introduces the distinction between 
the real telos of the camp (Auschwitz and Gulag) and the end of the camps as understood 
by totalitarians. Occasioning is in Heidegger’s language the essence of causality. The four 
causas let what is not yet present appear on earth. The Jews who were killed, the killers, 
the end of killing as explained by ideology, and the corpses in which the Jews were turned 
are the four causas that allowed Evil to arrive into presence. Technically speaking, the 
camps fabricate corpses, but they do not reveal the possibility of the Jews to be killed or to 
become corpses, they reveal our potential to be radically evil without consciously wanting 
it. The unlock evil without storing it. Arendt is saying that the radical evil is what 
happened in the end even if the totalitarians did not intentionally released it. While they 
were dedicatedly actualizing their ideologies in which everything is possible, unutilitarian, 
pure horror appeared on earth. The causa finalis for the Nazis, who are the causa 
eficiens, is not the final solution, but a new world order in which the Aryan race rules. The 
fabrication of corpses does not have its own purpose. The camp is not a place in which 
anything is fabricated for its own sense. Agamben, who biopolitically interprets Arendt’s 
camp as an experiment in destruction of human beings, faces the same problem. From the 
position of biopolitics the Muslim the sub-human, the walking bare life is the end, the 
causa finalis of the camp. This consequently means that the telos of biopolitics and the 
telos of the camps as understood by Nazis is not one and the same. The hidden nomos is 
hidden to everyone. The Muslim is for the Nazis an epiphenomenon of a death camp, an 
annoying step between a Jew and a corpse. To say that the Aryan life was produced 
through the creation of the Muslims would be unthinkable for Hitler. That would be like 
saying - tigers are produced by the reduction of worms to sub-worms.  
For Arendt and for Agamben the real telos of the camp is not known to the causa 
efficiens. However, their understandings of the horror which happened in the camp are in 
the end different. In the final segment of this paper I will show how an Arendtean 
interpretation of Omarska significantly differs from Agamben’s. 
IV.
Arendt would recognize the appearance of rape/concentration/extermination camps in 
Bosnia as the realization of her prophecy from The Origins… The fact that she later 
started thinking of the banality of evil is of no consequence for my paper. In the original 
story one of the key elements necessary for the success of totalitarian regimes was the 
appearance of masses, the people who do not recognize their political interests, who do 
not want to be represented by the existing parties and who are ruined by the crisis. The 
radical movement politicized masses by telling them that everything was possible. The 
collapse of socialist regimes was not as dramatic as the Big Crisis but it created the 
masses. The totalitarian ideology was replaced by nationalism, which secured the horizon 
for political action. The post-Cold-war Europe did the rest. When the conflict started the 
entire continent was a “bystander” in Arendt’s meaning of the word. The camps that were 
established in Bosnia should not be understood as experiments or laboratories outside the 
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normal penal system, but as a “phantom world” which was this time allowed to 
materialize in Bosnia. In The Origins… Arendt writes: 
”Everything that was done in the camps is known to us from the world of perverse 
malignant fantasies. The difficult thing to understand is that, like such fantasies, 
these gruesome crimes took place in a phantom world which, however, has 
materialized, as it were, into a world which is complete with all sensual data of reality 
but lacks that structure of consequence and responsibility without which reality 
remains for us a mass of incomprehensible data…(T)he totalitarian hell proves only 
that the power of man is greater than they ever dared to think, and that man can 
realize hellish fantasies without making the sky fall or the earth open.”18
The rape comp is a materialized phantom world, not a materialized biopolitical 
laboratory, and there is something radically banal in rape, which is that it can be done for 
its own sake, unlike the fabrication of the Muslims or the destruction of spontaneity. 
Agamben thinks that Omarska and Auschwitz are essentially the same, but not because 
both places secure the space in which evil appears. They are examples of the most 
developed state of exception which is not exceptional. The camp is in Arendt’s theory a 
rare and unique place of evil, while in Agamben’s argument it is a rule. Agamben does not 
look for the reasons why Omarska was established in the collapse of socialism, the 
collapse of former Yugoslavia and the post-Cold-war economy and politics. He does not 
search for the elements which crystallized in a regime capable of running a rape camp, but 
recognizes the common origin of modern political violence, the common origin of all 
camps. In Means Without End Agamben writes: 
“It is from this perspective that we need to see the reappearance of camps in a form 
that is, in a certain sense, even more extreme in the territories of the former 
Yugoslavia. What is happening there is not at all, as some interested observers 
rushed to declare, a redefinition of the old political system according to new ethnic 
and territorial arrangements…Rather, we note there an irreparable rupture of the old 
nomos as well as dislocation of populations and human lives according to entirely 
new lines of flight. That is why the camps of ethic rape are so crucially important. If 
the Nazis never thought of carrying out the “final solution” by impregnating Jewish 
women, that is because the principle of birth, which ensured the inscription of life in 
the order of the nation-state, was in some way still functioning, even though it was 
profoundly transformed.19
A few important points are made in this paragraph. It is obvious that Agamben thinks 
that Arendt’s approach from ‘The Decline…’ would not work in the case of former 
Yugoslavia and that Omarska is an example of unrestrained biopower, the final solution 
Serbian style. He is wrong. When a multinational federation collapses the minorities are 
created automatically in the same way in which they were created after the collapse of the 
18  Hannah Arendt: The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace & Company, New York, 1979, pp. 445-446.
19  Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000, pp. 44-45. 
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Austro-Hungarian monarchy. There is no new explanatory value in the idea of biopolitical 
fracture. The political consequences are the same. Ethnic cleansing is a radical solution 
for the problem of minorities in the state of war. “The lines of flight” are indistinguishable 
from the post-WWI ones, because the cleansed peoples either try to reach the mother 
nation’s state/republic, or go abroad and become a refugee population. The camps of 
ethnic rape are something entirely new. For some of the rapists it was the final solution 
without the complete extermination of the Bosnian Muslims. Agamben insightfully 
recognizes the biopolitical character of organized rape because it by brute force controls 
the bodily functions of the raped person and creates a non-Muslim baby. However, he is 
wrong when he believes that biopolitics can be traced  down to the origins of the nation 
state and its attempt to create a seamless people. Former Yugoslavia was a multinational 
federation which fractured along national lines; to say that the new set of biological 
fractures was created is nothing other than recognizing the problem of new minorities. 
Some nationalisms are racist and some are not and this has nothing to do with Foucault’s 
understanding of biopolitics. The reason why the Serbs raped Muslim women and the 
Germans did not rape Jewish women has nothing to do with the principle of birth and 
national order in Germany, but with a fact that in the Nazi type racism Jewish women 
were not seen as human beings worthy of rape, which was not the case with the Serbs. 
However, rape is an expression of pure violent power and has a sadistic quality that 
should not be overlooked. Omarska did not happen in a secured place beyond juridical 
order of a certain nation state but in the middle of Europe in broad daylight and on global 
TV. Agamben is at his best when he argues that the state of exception, as the state of 
nature is in-calculated in the New World Order; that the state of war is in the city, 
accepted in the nomos of exception. He is saying, loud and clear, that the extermination 
and rape camps can be established within the existing international order and can do 
their business for months or even years interrupted only by humanitarian operations. So, 
the current situation is neither ‘to kill or to let live’, nor ‘to make live and to let die’ but ‘to 
let kill and to stop killing’. The global sovereign is the one who decides when the camps 
should be closed. The problem for Agamben is that the sovereign runs his own camps. 
Arendt did not trust organized humanity, she explicitly says: “It is quite conceivable, 
and even within the realm of practical political possibilities, that one fine day a highly 
organized and mechanized humanity will conclude quite democratically – namely by 
majority decision – that for humanity as a whole it would be better to liquidate certain 
parts thereof.”20 She can imagine humanity operating as Agamben’s sovereign. Agamben 
himself does not tell us how to go beyond the camp as a global nomos other than to think 
about politics in a new way. He slips into polito-ontology whenever faced with a policy 
recommendation. 
It seems, however, that humans living on this planet will have to find new ways to 
govern the earth very soon, because Arendt’s prophesy has come true, and large parts of it 
are correctly interpreted by Agamben. Let us find the way to close rape camps and death 
camps first; evil is their unintended telos. This would be a promising start, the one we 
thought we would never have to make.
20 Hannah Arendt: The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace & Company, New York, 1979, p. 298. 
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